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1 Introduction
Labour markets constitute such a large part of the economy that issues of labour eco-
nomics can rarely be meaningfully addressed in partial equilibrium models. There are
roughly two types of general equilibrium models used in modelling labour markets. One
is a search model pioneered by Mortensen and Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000),
where unemployed and firms are involved in a time consuming activity of looking for
each other. In these models meetings are pairwise, and wages are determined using the
Nash bargaining solution or some analogous procedure. The central concept is so called
matching function which tells how fast the parties find each other. In the other branch
of models the meetings of the unemployed and vacancies are governed by an urn-ball
matching where, say, the employers are contacted by the workers (see e.g. Montgomery,
1991). The advantage of this approach is that the matching function can be determined
endogenously, and that it makes multiple meetings and detailed wage formation possible.
Several empirical findings are hard to come by in theoretical models. One of these is
the empirical wage distribution. A typical wage distribution for observationally identical
workers is hump-shaped and right-skewed (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996). Wage
distributions have been generated by search models with varying results. In Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), workers receive wage oﬀers from employers at an exogenous rate, and
workers search also on the job. With identical workers and identical firms, the wage oﬀer
density function is increasing. It can be declining only if firms or workers are heterogenous
in productivity.
There are articles (Mortensen, 2000; Bontemps, Robin and van den Berg, 2000) that
generate distributions of wages that more closely resemble the observed ones. To achieve
this, one needs to assume heterogeneity of workers or firms and some special features of
the matching function. These features are not derivable from the basics of the model but
are just assumed. Mortensen (2000) considers an on-the-job search model where workers
receive wage oﬀers from firms that can make match-specific investments after the firm and
worker have met. The meeting rate is the same for employed and unemployed workers,
and it depends positively on the number of vacancies. The firms are heterogenous ex
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post with respect to the amount of capital. Firms who oﬀer higher wages invest more in
match-specific capital, because workers who earn higher wages have a lower probability
to quit. The resulting wage oﬀer density can be increasing, decreasing, or hump-shaped.
However, for the density to be hump-shaped, it is required that the production function
is of Cobb-Douglas type, and that the parameter of the production function and the
exogenous reservation wage fall within certain limits. In Bontemps, Robin and van den
Berg (2000), employed and unemployed workers have diﬀerent, exogenous meeting rates.
Their model allows firms to have diﬀerent technologies, and they show that a suitable
distribution of employer productivity can lead to a hump-shaped distribution for wages.
In this article we demonstrate that one can, with very simple economic reasoning,
generate a significant improvement to the wage distribution when one uses an urn-ball
model, even though firms and workers are homogenous. We construct a model where
unemployed workers can send wage demands to vacant firms that hire the worker who
has demanded the lowest wage. We assume that workers do not know how many other
workers happen to contact the particular employer. This means that the workers must
use a mixed strategy in equilibrium. Simultaneously, vacant firms use a mixed strategy
in sending wage oﬀers to unemployed workers who accept the highest oﬀer. We derive
the mixed strategies explicitly. In order to accomplish the ideas of this article one cannot
stick to the search models where contacts are bilateral.
We get three kind of results in this article. First, the model has diﬀerent equilibrium
market structures depending on the unemployment-vacancy ratio. If the ratio is close
to one, there are three equilibrium market structures of which only one is stable in an
evolutionary sense. For a small ratio, there exist two equilibrium market structures of
which one is stable; the same holds for a large ratio. Second, we derive a non-degenerate
wage distribution, the shape of which depends on the unemployment-vacancy ratio. For a
ratio close to one, there exists a wage density function (associated with the evolutionarily
stable market structure) that is first increasing, in the end decreasing, and u-shaped in the
middle. Thus, we do not get exactly the wage distribution observed empirically but one
that still has several desirable features. Most of the literature has focused on one of the
non-stable equilibria. If the number of unemployed suﬃciently exceeds that of vacancies,
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the wage density function is decreasing; in the opposite case it is increasing. Third, in
utility terms the mixed strategy in wage oﬀers is equivalent to a mechanism where job
seekers randomly choose vacancies, and wages are determined in an auction where the
job seekers know the number of their competitors. Kultti (1999) shows the equivalence
between such auctions and posted prices; we thus know that all the three mechanisms
are equivalent in utility terms. Our model also predicts that if the relative supply of
labour increases, the average observed wage decreases if the unemployed-vacancy ratio
diﬀers suﬃciently from one; otherwise it increases.
We describe the general idea of the model in Section 2. Sections 3-6 consider a static
model that is suﬃcient to generate a wage distribution. We solve the wage demands and
oﬀers in Section 3. In Section 4 we solve the equilibrium market structure, that is, the
fractions of unemployed and vacancies who send oﬀers and who receive them. Section 5
analyses the evolutionary stability of the equilibrium. Section 6 presents the main result
of this article, the distribution of realised wages. Section 7 presents the main results of
two dynamic versions of the model. In the Appendix we derive most of the results of
Sections 3-6 as well as the analyses of the dynamic models. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
In the most general setting that we consider, everything is in the model, i.e. it is a true
general equilibrium model. The measure of workers is L, and the measure of employers
is K. Some of them are matched with each other in productive activities, while others
are looking for a partner. Denote the measure of unemployed workers (job seekers) by u
and the measure of vacancies by v. Production happens in pairs, therefore
L− u = K − v. (1)
A matched pair produces output worth of unity each period. A worker who is employed
at wage w ∈ [0, 1] gets the wage each period as long as the employment relationship lasts,
and correspondingly the employer gets 1−w each period. Utilities are linear such that a
worker’s utility is w, and firm’s utility is 1−w. Unmatched agents get zero utility. Time
is discrete and extends to infinity. Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be the common discount factor.
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We focus on the market in a steady state, and for this we need that the matches
dissolve every once and a while. We assume an exogenous separation probability s ∈
[0, 1] . Each period a match dissolves with probability s, and the firm and the worker
enter the pool of vacancies and unemployed. The separation probability is not just
something we need to be able to do steady state analysis, but it is a real feature of real
labour markets, and it makes possible to study the duration of unemployment, though
not an issue in this article.
One of the crucial features of our analysis is that we determine the equilibrium market
structure. Usually it is assumed that unemployed workers contact vacancies or vice versa.
We do not know which is the better assumption, and consequently we allow for both
possibilities and determine which case emerges in equilibrium. To this end we postulate
that there are two submarkets. Fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of unemployed workers and fraction
y ∈ [0, 1] of vacancies are in the ‘vacancy market’ where unemployed workers contact
vacancies. Each job seeker who decides to go to that market, chooses randomly one of
the yv vacancies and sends an application accompanied with a wage demand. We could
say that in the vacancy market, vacancies stay (or wait), and workers move. In the ‘job
seeker market’, each of the (1− y) v vacancies sends a wage oﬀer to one of the (1− x)u
unemployed workers. Another crucial feature is that the workers do not know which firms
the other workers apply to, nor do they know their wage demands. This is an auction
with identical valuations but unknown number of bidders. Each firm that has received
at least one application hires the worker who has asked for the lowest wage. Likewise,
the vacancies that send oﬀers do not know how much the other vacancies oﬀer and to
whom. A job seeker chooses the firm that has oﬀered the highest wage. We solve the
equilibrium fractions x and y as functions of u/v, and the distributions of wage oﬀers,
wage demands, and realised wages.
We focus on symmetric strategies regarding wage demands and oﬀers and probabilities
of going to either market. It is clear that there are no pure strategy equilibria, or equilibria
with a mass point for that matter, as to wage demands and oﬀers. The heuristic reason is
easy to understand by assuming that there is a pure strategy equilibrium where, say, the
unemployed demand wage w. There is a positive probability that a particular vacancy
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is contacted by more than one job seeker. When this happens, the probability that a
job seeker gets the job is at most one half. Making a wage demand slightly less than
w is a profitable deviation, as then the deviator gets the job for certain, i.e. there is a
discrete increase in his probability of getting the job while the wage remains practically
the same.1
The possibility of two markets is important theoretically, because it allows us to deter-
mine the market structure endogenously. It turns out that whether unemployed contact
vacancies, or vice versa, or whether two markets with these features exist simultaneously
depends on the ratio of unemployed to vacancies. The distribution of wages depends on
who contacts whom, and if it is just assumed that contacts take place in one way or the
other, there is a chance that the wrong, i.e. non-equilibrium, modelling decision is made.
This then produces an incorrect wage distribution.
The aim of this article is to derive the wage distribution produced by the urn-ball
models, where there are possibly two markets, and where wage oﬀers and demands origi-
nate from a mixed strategy. For this purpose it is suﬃcient to study a static model where
the only things of importance are the measures of unemployed and vacancies. This model
is got by setting the discount factor to zero and the separation rate to unity, so that each
match lasts exactly one period. A slightly more general model is got by assuming that the
discount factor is strictly positive but the separation rate is still unity. This corresponds
to a dynamic model where it is assumed that those who match exit the market and are
replaced by identical but unmatched agents. Here this is one possible interpretation, but
if one wants to think also this as a special case of the general model, it must be assumed
that the agents do not remember with whom they have been matched in the previous
periods. We conduct most of the analysis via the static model, but in the appendix we
provide the full equilibrium analysis of the two dynamic models, too.
1For a formal argument see Kultti and Virrankoski (2003) where in an analogous setting it is shown
that there exist only non-atomic mixed strategy equilibria in symmetric strategies. Moreover, it is shown
that the support of the mixed strategy must be an interval.
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3 Distributions of Wage Demands and Oﬀers
We assume that there are two submarkets; in one market vacancies contact unemployed
workers by sending wage oﬀers, whereas in the other market unemployed workers send
wage demands to vacancies. We examine these two cases separately and start from the
first one.
3.1 Vacancies Send Oﬀers to Unemployed Workers
In this job seeker market each vacancy sends a wage oﬀer to one randomly chosen un-
employed worker. The Poisson parameter that governs the arrivals of oﬀers to workers is
φ, which is the ratio of the number of oﬀer-sending vacancies to the the number of oﬀer-
receiving workers. (If all unemployed and vacancies are in this market, then φ = v/u.)
Let Vs be the utility of a vacancy that sends an oﬀer w. Vacancies use a mixed strategy
with cumulative distribution function H(w) with support [a, b]. The utility of a vacancy
is
Vs = e−φ(1− w) + φe−φ (1− w)H(w) + ...+
φke−φ
k!
(1− w) (H(w))k + ... (2)
= (1− w)e−φ(1−H(w)).
In the first term on the right-hand side, e−φ is the probability that the worker to whom
the vacancy sends an oﬀer does not get any other oﬀers, and the vacancy gets profit 1−w.
In the second term, φe−φ is the probability that the worker gets one other oﬀer, and the
vacancy we look at manages to hire the worker if the other vacancy’s oﬀer is lower than
w, this happens with probability H(w). The rest of the terms capture the probability
that the worker gets oﬀers from exactly k other vacancies, times the probability that they
oﬀer less than w. The mixed strategy gives (1− a)e−φ(1−H(a)) = (1− b)e−φ(1−H(b)). That
is, a vacancy’s utility is the same from oﬀer a as from oﬀer b. The lowest oﬀer a equals
zero, because there is a positive probability that the worker does not get any other oﬀers.
Using a = 0, H(a) = 0 and H(b) = 1, the upper limit of the wage oﬀers is b = 1− e−φ.
The utility of a vacancy is therefore
Vs = e−φ. (3)
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Using Vs = (1− w)e−φ(1−H(w)) = e−φ we get
H(w) = −1
φ
ln(1− w) (4)
with support w ∈
£
0, 1− e−φ
¤
. The density function is
h (w) ≡ H 0(w) = 1φ(1− w) , (5)
which is increasing in w.
The expected utility of an unemployed worker in this market is equal to Ur:
Ur =
bZ
a
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
h(w)k (H(w))k−1wdw (6)
=
bZ
a
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
k
φ (1− w)
Ã
ln (1− w)−1
φ
!k−1
wdw
=
bZ
a
∞X
k=1
¡
ln (1− w)−1
¢k−1 e−φ
(k − 1)!
w
1− wdw
=
bZ
a
∞X
k=0
¡
ln (1− w)−1
¢k e−φ
k!
w
1− wdw =
bZ
a
e−φeln(1−w)
−1 w
1− wdw
= e−φ
bZ
a
w
(1− w)2
dw = e−φ
bZ
a
µ
1
(1− w)2
− 1
1− w
¶
dw (7)
= e−φ
·
ln (1− b) + 1
1− b − ln (1− a)−
1
1− a
¸
= 1− e−φ − φe−φ.
The probability that the job seeker gets k oﬀers is φ
ke−φ
k! . The probability of getting
oﬀer w is h(w), and the probability that the wage oﬀered by vacancy i is the highest is
(H(w))k−1: all k− 1 oﬀers must be lower than w. The highest oﬀer can be made by any
of the k vacancies. In the second line we use (4) and (5) .
3.2 Unemployed Workers Send Applications to Vacancies
Let Us be the utility of an unemployed job seeker who sends an application with wage
demand w. They use a mixed strategy with cumulative distribution function F (w) with
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support [A,B]. Let θ be the appropriate Poisson parameter that governs the meeting
probabilities (If all workers and firms are in this market, then θ = u/v.) We have
Us = e−θw + θe−θ (1− F (w))w + ...+
θke−θ
k! (1− F (w))
k w + ... (8)
= we−θ
"
1 +
∞X
k=1
θk
k! (1− F (w))
k
#
= we−θ
∞X
k=0
θk (1− F (w))k
k!
= we−θF (w).
In the above, e−θ is the probability that the vacancy to whom the worker sends an
oﬀer does not get an oﬀer from any other worker, thus the worker gets w. In the rest
of the terms,
θke−θ
k! is the probability that the vacancy gets applications from k other
workers. In these cases, (1− F (w))k is the probability that all these wage demands are
higher than w, thus the vacancy rejects these applications and hires our worker.
The utility of a job seeker is the same for all w ∈ [A,B], especially Ae−θF (A) =
Be−θF (B). Clearly, B = 1, because the probability that the job seeker in question is the
only applicant is positive. Then Ae−θF (A) = e−θ ⇒ A = e−θ, and
Us = e−θ. (9)
Next we solve F (w). We have Us = e−θ = we−θF (w). Taking logarithms results in
ln e−θF (w) = ln e−θ − lnw ⇔ θF (w) = θ + lnw, and the resulting distribution function is
F (w) = 1 + lnwθ , (10)
with support w ∈
£
e−θ, 1
¤
. The density function is
f (w) ≡ F 0(w) = 1
θw
, (11)
which is decreasing in w.
The expected utility of a vacancy in this market is equal to Vr:
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Vr =
BZ
A
∞X
k=0
θke−θ
k! f(w)k (1− F (w))
k−1 (1− w)dw (12)
=
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k!
h
− (1− F (B))k + (1− F (A))k
i
−
BZ
A
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k!
f(w)k (1− F (w))k−1wdw
= 1− e−θ −
BZ
A
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k!
1
θw
k
µ
lnw−1
θ
¶k−1
wdw
= 1− e−θ −
BZ
A
∞X
k=0
(lnw−1)k
k! e
−θdw = 1− e−θ −
BZ
A
e−θ
w dw
= 1− e−θ − e−θ
¡
ln 1− ln e−θ
¢
= 1− e−θ − θe−θ.
The probability that the vacancy gets k applications is θ
ke−θ
k!
, and the probability
that the wage asked by job seeker i is the lowest is (1− F (w))k−1: all other k−1 demands
must be higher. The lowest demand can be made by any of the k job seekers.
4 Equilibrium Market Structure
In an equilibrium where two markets coexist, the utility of a vacancy that sends oﬀers
is the same as the utility of a vacancy who receives wage demands from unemployed
workers. The same equivalence condition between sending oﬀers and receiving them
holds for unemployed workers, too. That is, we have Vs = Vr and Us = Ur, and inserting
the utilities derived above yields
e−φ = 1− e−θ − θe−θ, (13)
e−θ = 1− e−φ − φe−φ. (14)
Equation (13) is called vacancies’ equilibrium condition V E, and equation (14) is called
unemployed workers’ equilibrium condition UE. When both conditions hold, we have
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θe−θ = φe−φ, and after substitution we get
φ = θe
−θ
1− e−θ − θe−θ , (15)
θ = φe
−φ
1− e−φ − φe−φ . (16)
Using (15) and (16) in θe−θ = φe−φ results in
1− e−θ − θe−θ − e
−θe−θ
1− e−θ − θe−θ = 0, (17)
1− e−φ − φe−φ − e
−φe−φ
1− e−φ − φe−φ = 0. (18)
The solution of (17) and (18) is θ = φ ≈ 1.146 which is denoted by θ0. This means
that if both markets coexist, the Poisson parameter that governs the arrival rates is the
same, θ0, in both markets. Denoting u/v by α, the equilibrium fractions of vacancies and
unemployed workers in the two markets satisfy
θ0 =
αx
y =
1− y
α (1− x) , (19)
and after a few steps we have
x = θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
α
¡
θ20 − 1
¢ , (20)
y = αθ0 − 1
θ20 − 1
. (21)
Proposition 1 The vacancy market and the job-seeker market coexist if α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
.
Proof. The two markets coexist only if x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1). By (20) and (21)
this holds only if α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
.
The two markets coexist only if there are roughly equally many vacancies and un-
employed workers in the economy. Because x = θ0α y and α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
, we get
θ0
α ∈
(1, 1.313), which implies that x > y in equilibrium. If α /∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
, search is one-
sided. We can directly use a result derived in Kultti, Miettunen, Takalo, and Virrankoski
(2004)2:
2A model by Kultti, Miettunen, Takalo and Virrankoski (2004) considers buyers’ and sellers’ decisions
to wait or search, with auction and bargaining as alternative trading mechanisms. It turns out that the
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Proposition 2 i) If α < 1θ0
, then x = y = 0, ii) if α > θ0, then x = y = 1.
Proof. The proof is lengthy, and it is presented in Kultti, Miettunen, Takalo, and
Virrankoski (2004).
If u/v is small, all the vacancies send wage oﬀers and none of the unemployed workers
send wage demands. If u/v is large, all the unemployed workers send wage demands and
none of the vacancies send wage oﬀers. The idea of the proof is the following: Assume
that α > θ0, and that all the vacancies send wage oﬀers and none of the unemployed send
wage demands. It can be shown that there exists a deviating coalition of vacancies and
unemployed such that all deviators would be better oﬀ in a market where unemployed
send wage demands and none of the vacancies sends oﬀers. Then, the original market
cannot be an equilibrium. On the other hand, if α > θ0 and all the unemployed workers
send wage demands and none of the vacancies sends oﬀers, a deviating coalition does not
exist. Unemployed would prefer the new market where vacancies send oﬀers only if the
Poisson parameter in the new market is large enough, whereas vacancies prefer the new
market only if the Poisson parameter is small enough. It can be shown that if α > θ0, the
required supports for the Poisson parameter do not overlap, thus a deviating coalition
cannot exist. If α < 1θ0
, an analogous reasoning applies. If there are a lot of unemployed
compared to vacancies, Proposition 2 implies that the wage oﬀer density function and
the density function for realised wages (determined later in Section 6) are decreasing,
whereas in case of relatively numerous vacancies, the density functions are increasing.
The utilities in the two sided market are given by
Proposition 3 In the two-sided market, Us = Vs = e−θ0, and Ur = Vr = 1−e−θ0−θ0e−θ0.
Proof. By θ = φ = θ0 in the two-sided market.
The game where the agents send oﬀers using a mixed strategy turns out to have an
interesting equivalence with two other trading mechanisms:
Remark 1 The mixed strategies in wage oﬀers are utilitywise equivalent (i) to an auction
where the bidders know the number of competitors, and (ii) to a price-posting game where
model with auction is utilitywise the same as the wage oﬀer model presented here; also the fractions of
staying and moving agents are the same as given by formulae (15) and (16) above.
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one side of the market posts prices, and all agents on the other side choose their trading
partners based on prices.
The utilities Vr = 1−e−θ−θe−θ and Us = e−θ given above are the same as the utilities
for a seller and a buyer in the static version of Kultti (1999). In his auction model each
buyer contacts one randomly chosen seller (buyers move and sellers wait), just like job
seekers contact vacancies in the present model, except that buyers do not send price
oﬀers but engage in auction (a Bertrand competition) after it has been revealed how
many buyers arrived in a seller’s location.
5 Stability of the Equilibrium Market Structure
We can interpret the population shares x and y as strategies of the entering unemployed
workers and vacancies, that is, as the probabilities of going to the vacancy market. The
probabilities of going to the job seeker market are 1− x and 1− y. Proposition 1 above
and Lemma 1 below show that the model has three equilibrium market structures if
α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
: Either x = y = 0, or x = y = 1, or x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1). The selection
between equilibria is modelled by using an evolutionary argument. Outside equilibrium
the agents behave myopically and go to the market where their type fared best in the
previous period. The adjustment process is diﬀerential, and formalisable by replicator
dynamics (see e.g. Lu and McAfee, 1996).3 To define replicator dynamics let us first
establish notation for the unemployed workers’ and vacancies’ average expected utilities
U and V , given population shares x and y: U = xUs+(1−x)Ur and V = yVr+(1−y)Vs. In
the replicator dynamics the population shares are determined by the following diﬀerential
equations:
dx
dt = x(Us − U) = x(1− x)(Us − Ur) (22)
dy
dt
= y(Vr − V ) = y(1− y)(Vr − Vs). (23)
3Althoug this is a static (one-shot) model, we can still use replicator dynamics. Instead of assuming
agents who live many periods, we assume consecutive generations of one-period-living agents. Or, in a
dynamic model, the reservation values are discounted, and the discount factor approaches zero.
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Definition 1 An equilibrium (x, y) is evolutionarily stable if there exists a neighbourhood
of (x, y) where the replicator dynamics converges to the equilibrium.
The replicator dynamics can be easily performed graphically. In Figure 1 we have
drawn the equilibrium curves V E and UE on where, by equations (22) and (23), dx
dt
= 0
and
dy
dt = 0. Next we determine the positions of these curves in (x, y)-space. First we
state
Lemma 1 Equilibrium curves V E and UE go through (0, 0) and (1, 1).
Proof. In Appendix 1.1
We have thus shown that (0, 0) and (1, 1) are pure strategy equilibria. A mixed-
strategy equilibrium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is economically meaningful only if it
is stable. The uniqueness and stability of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is studied in (x, y)
-plane (see Figure 1). Along vacancies’ equilibrium V E, we have e−φ = 1− e−θ − θe−θ.
The respective equilibrium condition for unemployed, UE, is e−θ = 1 − e−φ − φe−φ.
Parameter θ = xuyv governs the arrival of workers’ applications to vacancies, whereas
workers receive vacancies’ oﬀers governed by parameter φ = (1− y) v
(1− x) u .
Proposition 4 The mixed-strategy equilibrium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is unique
and evolutionarily stable.
Proof. In Appendix 1.2
Lemma 1 tells us that x = y = 0 or x = y = 1 are also equilibria, by (30) and (31) we
know that V E and UE are increasing, and by (20) and (21) we know that at x ∈ (0, 1)
and y ∈ (0, 1) they have a unique intersection. If x = y = 1, all unemployed workers send
applications to vacancies, and none of the vacancies send oﬀers to unemployed workers,
and if x = y = 0, vice versa. However, we know that those equilibria are necessarily
unstable, because the equilibrium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is stable.
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6 Aggregate Distribution of Wages
Vacancies and workers draw their wage oﬀers and demands from distributions H(w) and
F (w) which are unobserved. The realised distributions (that are observed) diﬀer from
the oﬀers and demands because waiting vacancies hire the worker who has demanded
the lowest wage, and waiting workers accept the highest oﬀer. Denote the cumulative
distribution of realised wages by G(w) in the vacancy market and by M(w) in the job
seeker market. We have
M (w) =
∞P
k=1
φke−φ
k!
(H(w))k
1− e−φ (24)
=
e−φ(1−H(w)) − e−φ
1− e−φ
=
e−φ
µ
1
1− w − 1
¶
1− e−φ .
That is, M (w) is the probability that the highest oﬀer, conditional on the job seeker
receiving at least one oﬀer, is equal to or less than w. The denominator 1−e−φ conditions
for receiving at least one oﬀer. The density function is
m (w) =M 0(w) = e
−φ
(1− e−φ) (1− w)2
. (25)
In the vacancy market the probability of having w as the lowest wage demand received
by a vacancy, conditional on receiving at least one application, is
G(w) =
∞P
k=1
θke−θ
k!
h
1− (1− F (w))k
i
1− e−θ (26)
=
1− e−θ − e−θ
∞P
k=1
θk (1− F (w))k
k!
1− e−θ
=
1− e−θ − e−θ
¡
eθ(1−F (w)) − 1
¢
1− e−θ
=
1− e−θF (w)
1− e−θ ,
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where the denominator 1 − e−θ conditions for receiving at least one application. Using
F (w) = 1 + lnw
θ
we end up with
G(w) =
1− e
−θ
w
1− e−θ . (27)
The density function is
g(w) ≡ G0(w) = e
−θ
(1− e−θ)w2 . (28)
The value of m (w) is the probability that w is the highest oﬀer a waiting job seeker
gets; that is, m (w) is the probability that his realised wage is w. Similarly, the value of
g(w) is the probability that w is the lowest wage demand that a waiting vacancy receives.
The realised aggregate density function of wages, r(w), is a weighted combination of
densities g(w) and m (w) as follows:
r(w) =



m (w) (1− x)u
(1− x)u+ yv if w ∈
£
0, e−θ
¤
,
m (w) (1− x)u+ g(w)yv
(1− x)u+ yv if w ∈ (e
−θ, 1− e−φ],
g(w)yv
(1− x) u+ yv if w ∈ (1− e
−φ, 1].
(29)
Job seekers do not send wage demands lower than e−θ: For w < e−θ, only vacancies
send oﬀers, and there are (1− x) u job seekers who receive them. Vacancies do not send
oﬀers higher than 1− e−φ: for w > 1− e−φ, only job seekers send oﬀers to yv vacancies.
For middle-range wages, (1− y)v vacancies send oﬀers to (1− x)u unemployed workers
and xu unemployed workers send wage demands to yv vacancies. Using the equilibrium
values for x and y, from (20) and (21) , and the solutions for the density functions from
(25) and (28), and result θ = φ = θ0, gives
Proposition 5 The density function of realised wages r(w) satisfies
r(w) =



e−θ0 (θ0 − α)
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α) (1− w)2
if w ∈ [0, e−θ0),
e−θ0
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α)
·
θ0 − α
(1− w)2
+
αθ0 − 1
w2
¸
if w ∈
£
e−θ0 , 1− e−θ0
¤
,
e−θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α)w2
if w ∈ (1− e−θ0 , 1].
where α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
, and θ0 is the solution to equation (17).
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For u = v, Figures 2a and 2b show the density functions of realised wages in the job
seeker market and in the vacancy market, respectively. Figure 2c shows the aggregate
wage density function. The wage distribution is first increasing, in the end decreasing,
and u-shaped in the middle. Thus, we do not get exactly the wage distribution observed
empirically but one that still has several desirable features. Figures 3a - 3c show that if
the ratio u/v increases, the wage density function becomes skewed to the right because
the relative size of the vacancy market grows.
A change in the relative number of unemployed workers aﬀects the expected wage in
a non-expected way:
Proposition 6 The expected wage is non-monotonous in u/v. a) If 0 < α < 1
θ0
, only the
job seeker market exists, and an increase in α decreases the expected wage b) If α > θ0,
only the vacancy market exists, and an increase in α decreases the expected wage c) If
1
θ0
≤ α ≤ θ0, a two-sided market exists, and an increase in α increases the expected wage.
Proof. In Appendix A1.3.
Perhaps surprisingly, the expected realised wage can increase as α increases. This
outcome results because in the case where the two markets exist, an increase in α increases
the relative size of the vacancy market (where job seekers send wage demands). In the
vacancy market, the wage density function has a fat right tail, and as α increases, the
aggregate distribution will have more mass on the right, despite of the rise of the peak at
w = e−θ0. The probability that a job seeker is not hired in the vacancy market is 1− e
−θ0
e−θ0 ,
whereas the probability that he is not hired in the job seeker market is e−θ0. Clearly,
1− e−θ0
e−θ0 > e
−θ0. However, the utility of a worker is Us = e−θ0 in the vacancy market,
and it is Ur = 1−e−θ0−θ0e−θ0 in the job seeker market, as shown in Proposition 3. That
is, if the vacancy market grows, the lower matching probability is exactly compensated
by an increase in the expected wage.
7 Dynamic Models
The static version of the model is suﬃcient for generating a wage distribution. Still,
one may be interested in dynamics, especially if there are data on discount factors or
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separation rates. This in mind we provide the central results of two dynamic models in
this section. The wage distribution looks pretty much the same as in the static model.
The detailed derivation of the results is relegated to the appendix. The analysis mirrors
to the most part the analysis of the static case, but the derivation of the equilibrium
mixed strategies for wage demands and oﬀers is more complicated. This is because the
upper and lower limits of the support of the strategies are now endogenously determined
by the expected life time utilities, while in the static model the outside option, or the
expected life time utility, of an agent who rejects an oﬀer is zero.
7.1 A Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Model
Instead of assuming one-period-living agents, we now assume that the agents live infinitely
long and discount future at rate δ. The agents send and receive oﬀers each period until
they are matched. A matched pair exits the economy and produces an output the total
discounted value of which is unity. The matched agents are replaced by identical but
yet unmatched agents. Each vacancy and worker who send wage oﬀers use a symmetric
mixed strategy. The equilibrium fractions of agents in the vacancy market are the same
as in the static model:
x = θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
α
¡
θ20 − 1
¢ ,
y = αθ0 − 1
θ20 − 1
.
Proposition 7 There exist 0 < a < A < b < B < 1 such that the aggregate density of
realized wages in the two-sided market is
r(w) =



m(w)(1− x)α
(1− x)α+ y if a ≤ w < A,
m(w)(1− x)α+ g(w)y
(1− x)α+ y if A ≤ w ≤ b,
g(w)yα
(1− x)α+ y if b < w ≤ B, .
where
m(w) = (1− δ)e
−θ0(1− δθ0e−θ0)
(1− e−θ0) [(1− w)(1− δθ0e−θ0)− δe−θ]2
,
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g(w) =
¡
1− δθ0e−θ0
¢
(1− δ)e−θ0
(1− e−θ0) [w(1− δθ0e−θ0)− δe−θ0]2
,
α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
,and where θ0 satisfies (17), θ0 ≈ 1.146.
The above result is derived in detail in Appendix 2. The boundaries are a =
δ
¡
1− e−θ0 − θ0e−θ0
¢
1− δθ0e−θ0
, b = 1− e
−θ0 − δθ0e−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
, A = e
−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
, and B = 1− δ + δe
−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
.
The wage distribution is qualitatively very similar to that in the static model: It is low
and increasing at low wages, high and decreasing at high wages, and high and u-shaped
a the middle-range wages. An increase in δ makes the wage distribution to concentrate
towards the middle of the wage range, because
da
dδ > 0,
dA
dδ > 0,
db
dδ < 0, and
dB
dδ < 0.
That is, when job seekers and vacancies become more patient, the job seekers’ reservation
wage increases, but their highest wage demand decreases because the vacancies are more
willing to wait for low wage demands. Increased patience lowers the highest wage oﬀer
made by vacancies but increases the lowest oﬀer, because the job seekers are more willing
to wait for good oﬀers.
7.2 A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
The general equilibrium model described in Section 2 gives the same equilibrium market
structure as the two other models. For the aggregate wage distribution we have
Proposition 8 There exist 0 < a < A < b < B < 1 such that the aggregate density of
realised wages in the two-sided markets
r(w) =



m(w)(1− x)α
(1− x)α+ y if a ≤ w < A,
m(w)(1− x)α+ g(w)y
(1− x)α+ y if A ≤ w ≤ b,
g(w)yα
(1− x)α+ y if b < w ≤ B,
where
m(w) =
¡
1− δ(1− s)θ0e−θ0
¢
(1− δ(1− s))e−θ0
(1− e−θ0) [(1− w)(1− δ(1− s)θ0e−θ0)− δ(1− s)e−θ0 ]2
,
g(w) =
¡
1− δ(1− s) θ0e− θ0
¢
(1− δ(1− s))e− θ0
(1− e− θ0) [w(1− δ(1− s) θ0e− θ0)− δ(1− s)e− θ0 ]
,
α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
,and where θ0 satisfies (17), θ0 ≈ 1.146.
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The above result is derived in detail in Appendix 3. The boundaries are a =
δ(1− s)
¡
1− e−θ0 − θ0e−θ0
¢
1− δ(1− s)θ0e−θ0
, b = 1− δ(1− s)θ0e
−θ0 − e−θ0
1− δ(1− s)θ0e−θ0
, A = e
− θ0
1− δ(1− s) θ0e− θ0
,
B =
1− δ(1− s)
¡
1− e− θ0
¢
1− δ(1− s) θ0e− θ0
. The wage distribution responses to changes in δ in the
same way as in the simpler dynamic model, and it gets more concentrated around the
middle of the wage range if matches last longer. In order to have a two-sided market, we
must have α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
. This imposes restrictions on the relative magnitude of L and
K, the total numbers of workers and firms. Let L/K ≡ β.
Proposition 9 In order to have a two-sided market, we must have
L
K ∈
¡
β (s) , β (s)
¢
,
where s ∈ [0, 1] , β (1) = 1/θ0 , β(1) = θ0,
∂β
∂s < 0, and
∂β
∂s > 0.
Proof. If β < 1, then α < β for all values of s less than one. Therefore, in order to
have a two-sided market, the lower bound for β, denoted by β, equals 1/θ0 if s = 1. A
change in s aﬀects α: ∂α
ds
=
−(L−K)∂v∂s
v2
. An increase in s increases the steady state
number of vacancies, therefore we have
∂α
ds
> 0 if L < K. Therefore, a decrease in s
increases β . If β > 1, α > β for all values of s less than one. The upper bound for β for
having a two-sided market is β. If s = 1, β = θ0. By an analogous reasoning, a decrease
in s decreases β.
Proposition 9 says that in the general equilibrium model, in order to have a two-sided
market, the boundaries for the relative number of workers and firms are tighter than the
boundaries for the relative number of unemployed and vacancies.
8 Conclusion
We derive a wage density function for homogenous firms and homogenous workers. Both
vacancies and unemployed workers can send wage demands or oﬀers, which is what we
often see happening in real labour markets. We show that the symmetric equilibrium
for oﬀers and demands is in mixed strategies, and we solve the equilibrium fractions of
vacancies and unemployed workers who are engaged in sending or receiving oﬀers. If
the measure of firms is roughly the same as the measure of workers, a two-sided market
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exists. We show that there then exists a wage density function that is first increasing,
in the end decreasing, and in the middle either increasing, decreasing or u-shaped. The
wage distribution the model produces is not exactly the one observed empirically, but
it is fairly close to that. It is notable that we get this distribution without assuming
any kind of heterogeneity among workers or firms. The model has several equilibria, but
only the evolutionarily stable one produces the interesting wage distribution. For roughly
equal-sized pools of firms and workers, the equilibria that are associated with monotonous
distributions are unstable. Our model also predicts that the expected realised wage is
non-monotonous in the relative supply of labour. Another interesting result is that the
mixed strategies that vacancies and job seekers use when sending oﬀers are utilitywise
equivalent to auctions where the agents know the number of their competitors.
We believe that our approach oﬀers plenty of chances for applications and gener-
alisations. The meeting technology we use means that the matching function is well
determined with a firm microfoundation. Consequently, one can do rigorous comparative
statics as nothing comes from outside of the model. In particular, one can determine
the response of duration of unemployment spells when the measure of workers or firms
changes, or when the expected life-span of matches changes. The model is well suited to
consider the implications of worker/firm heterogeneity on wage distribution.
Our view is that the results of this article nicely illuminate the strengths of the urn-
ball model over the search models. In the end, it is clear that whatever one can do using
the search models, one can also do using the urn-ball models, and with the latter ones
one can do much more, with no need to postulate the black box of a matching function.
To give another example, it is relatively straightforward to consider a situation where
vacancies post wages that are observed by the unemployed workers who strategically
decide which vacancy to contact based on the observed wage oﬀers (see e.g. Kultti 1999;
Julien, Kennes and King, 2001). This is practically impossible in the search models.
Against this background it is somewhat a mystery to us why search models are still used.
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Appendix
A1 THE STATIC MODEL
A1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Vacancies’ equilibrium V E can be written as
1− e
−
xu
yv − xu
yv
e
−
xu
yv − e
−
(1− y) v
(1− x)u = 0,
and unemployed workers’ equilibrium UE is
1− e
−
(1− y) v
(1− x) u − (1− y) v
(1− x) ue
−
(1− y) v
(1− x) u − e
−
xu
yv = 0.
The behaviour of V E and UE near (0, 0) is analyzed first.
1. (x, y) → (0, y) . i) V E becomes −e
−
(1− y) v
u = 0, which cannot hold for any
y ∈ [0, 1]. ii) UE becomes −e
−
(1− y) v
u − (1− y) vu e
−
(1− y) v
u = 0, which cannot hold
for any y ∈ [0, 1].
2. (x, y) → (x, 0). i) V E becomes 1 − e
−
v
(1− x) u = 0, which cannot hold for any
x ∈ [0, 1]. ii) UE becomes 1 − e
−
v
(1− x) u − v
(1− x) ue
−
v
(1− x) u = 0, which does not
hold for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Clearly, neither V E nor UE cannot go through (0, y) or (x, 0), so they must go through
(0, 0). We check that this is possible. Assume that along V E, x/y → a as x → 0 and
y → 0. Then
lim
x→0,y→0
1− y
1− x = lim


1
1− x −
1
1
y −
x
y

 = 1− lim
1
1
y − a
= 1.
Then
lim
x→0,y→0
¡
1− e−θ − θe−θ − e−φ
¢
= 1− e−aα − aαe−aα − e−1/α,
which, by for example letting α = 1, equals zero if a = 1.285. For any other α > 0 one
can find a > 0 that satisfies V E going through (0, 0). Assume that along UE, x/y → b
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as x→ 0 and y → 0. Then
lim
x→0,y→0
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ − e−θ
¢
= 1− e−1/α − 1αe
−1/α − e−bα,
which equals zero if α = 1 and b = 1.33. Because a < b, V E is above UE near (0, 0),
which is does not contradict UE being steeper than V E in their intersection at strictly
positive x and y.
Next check the curves’ positions near (1, 1).
1. (x, y) → (x, 1) . i) V E becomes −e
−
xu
v − xu
v
e
−
xu
v = 0, which cannot hold for any
x ∈ [0, 1]. ii) UE becomes −e
−
xu
v = 0, which cannot hold for any x ∈ [0, 1].
2. (x, y)→ (1, y) . i) V E becomes 1− e
−
u
yv − u
yv
e
−
u
yv = 0, which cannot hold for any
y ∈ [0, 1]. ii) UE becomes 1− e
−
u
yv = 0, which cannot hold for any y ∈ [0, 1].
We see that V E and UE must go through (1, 1). As x and y approach 1, assume that
1− y
1− x → c along V E and
1− y
1− x → g along UE. Then V E becomes
lim
x→1,y→1
¡
1− e−θ − θe−θ − e−φ
¢
= 1− e−α − αe−α − e−c/α = 0,
which holds for example if α = 1 and c = 1.33. In the limit UE equals
lim
x→1,y→1
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ − e−θ0
¢
= 1− e−g/α − gαe
−g/α − e−α = 0;
with α = 1 it holds if g = 1.285. Near (1, 1), UE lies above V E, which is consistent with
UE being steeper than V E in their intersection at strictly positive x and y. ¥
A1.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The uniqueness is directly seen from (20) and (21). In order to solve the stability of
a mixed-strategy equilibrium we determine the positions of V E and UE. When diﬀer-
entiating V E and UE with respect to x and y, we use the following results: ∂θ∂x =
α
y ,
∂θ
∂x
=
−αx
y2
,
∂φ
∂x
=
φ
1− x , and
∂φ
∂y
= − 1
(1− x)α . Diﬀerentiating V E with respect to x
and y yields
dy
dx
|V E= φe
−φαy + θe−θα2 (1− x)
e−φy + θ2e−θα (1− x)
, (30)
25
and along UE,
dy
dx
|UE= e
−θα2 (1− x) + φ2e−φαy
θe−θα (1− x) + φe−φy . (31)
Both equilibrium curves have a positive slope. Waiting firms fare equally well as moving
firms only if an increase in the share of moving workers is accompanied with an increase
in the share of waiting firms. The same kind of intuition applies for workers’ equilibrium
condition, too. Next we look whether V E is steeper than UE in equilibrium, or the other
way round. Subtracting the right-hand side of (31) from that of (30) yields, after a few
steps, that sign
µ
dy
dx |V E −
dy
dx |UE
¶
= sign
¡
2θφ− θ2φ2 − 1
¢
. In equilibrium θ = φ =
θ0 ≈ 1.146. Function 2z2 − z4 − 1 has a unique maximum of zero at z = 1, therefore
2θ20−θ40−1 < 0, which indicates that in equilibrium UE is steeper than V E. In studying
the stability of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we compare the utility from waiting and
moving for firms and workers when they are oﬀ the equilibrium curve. The diﬀerence of
utilities of waiting and moving for firms is Vr − Vs = 1− e−θ − θe−θ− e−φ. Suppose that
a firm is on V E, and then the fraction of moving workers, x, increases. Then
∂ (Vr − Vs)
∂x
=
∂
¡
1− e−θ − θe−θ − e−φ
¢
∂x
=
θe−θα
y
+
φe−φ
1− x > 0, (32)
which indicates that for a firm, it is now more profitable to wait than move, and therefore
the fraction of waiting firms, y, will increase. For workers, Ur−Us = 1−e−φ−φe−φ−e−θ.
If a worker is on UE, and then y increases, the utility diﬀerence changes by
∂ (Ur − Us)
∂x =
∂
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ − e−θ
¢
∂y = −
φe−φ
(1− x)α −
e−θαx
y2 < 0. (33)
If the fraction of waiting firms increases, waiting becomes less appealing for workers
compared to moving, therefore x will increase. In (x, y) -plane, y decreases above V E
and increases below it, and x increase on the left of UE and decreases on the right of it.
A1.3 Proof of Proposition 6 (The expected wage in the static model)
a) If only the job-seeker market exists (this happens if u/v < 1/θ0), the density function
for the realized wages is
m(w) = e
−φ
(1− e−φ) (1− w)2
,
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and the expected wage is
we =
1−e−φZ
0
e−φw
(1− e−φ) (1− w)2
dw
=
1− e−φ − φe−φ
1− e−φ .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to φ (= v/u) yields
dwe
dφ =
−e−φ
¡
1− φ− e−φ
¢
(1− e−φ)2
> 0.
An increase in u/v thus decreases the expected wage.
b) If only the vacancy market exists (this happens if u/v > θ0), the density function for
the realized wages is
g(w) = e
−θ
(1− e−θ)w2 ,
and the expected wage is
we =
1Z
e−θ
e−θw
(1− e−θ)w2dw
=
θe−θ
1− e−θ .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to θ (= u/v) yields
dwe
dθ
=
e−θ
¡
1− θ − e−θ
¢
(1− e−θ)2
< 0.
An increase in u/v thus decreases the expected wage.
c) If both job-seeker market and vacancy market exist, the expected realized wage equals
we =
e−θ0Z
0
wr(w)dw +
1−e−θ0Z
e−θ0
wr(w)dw +
1Z
1−e−θ0
wr(w)dw
=
e−θ0Z
0
e−θ0 (θ0 − α)
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α) (1− w)2
wdw
+
1−e−θ0Z
e−θ0
e−θ0
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α)
·
θ0 − α
(1− w)2
+
αθ0 − 1
w2
¸
wdw
+
1Z
1−e−θ0
e−θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
(1− e−θ0) (θ0 − 1) (1 + α)w2
wdw,
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which results in
we = (5. 318 6× 10
−5) (5731− 5000α)
1 + α
+
µ
(0.916 57) e− 1.1462 (1.1462− α)
(1− e− 1.1462) ( 1.1462− 1) (1 + α)
¶
+
µ
(0.763 71) e− 1.1462 (α(1.1462)− 1)
(1− e− 1.1462) ( 1.1462− 1) (1 + α)
¶
+
(2. 438× 10−4) (5731α− 5000)
1 + α
Diﬀerentiating with respect to α yields
dwe
dα = 2.0× 10
−94. 999 5× 108 + 28010α
(1 + α)2
> 0.¥
A2 A DYNAMIC PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
A2.1 Vacancies send oﬀers to unemployed workers
Let us study a situation where the unemployed workers are like urns and vacancies as
balls. Our aim is to determine the mixed strategy of the vacancies in a dynamic model
focusing on a steady-state. It turns out that the agents’ expected utilities are the same as
in a corresponding model where the wages are determined by auction. We need the results
of the auction to determine the mixed strategies, and that in mind we first determine the
agents’ expected utilities under auction. The unemployed workers’ and the vacancies’
utilities are determined by the following equations
Uaucr = (e−φ + φe−φ)δUaucr + (1− e−φ − φe−φ)(1− δV aucs ), (34)
V aucs = e−φ(1− δUaucr ) + (1− e−φ)δV aucs. (35)
In (34), e−φ is the probability that no vacancy comes to the unemployed worker, and
φe−φ is probability of just one vacancy arriving, in which case the vacancy makes a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer. In both these cases, the unemployed worker continues to the next
period with his discounted reservation value δUaucr . If he gets two or more vacancies, the
vacancies engage in Bertrand competition for the right to employ the worker. The va-
cancies, regardless of which of them employs the worker, get their discounted reservation
value δV aucs , and the worker gets 1− δV aucs . In (35), with probability e−φ the vacancy is
the only one that meets the worker, the vacancy makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and gets
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one minus the unemployed worker’s discounted reservation value. If the vacancy has at
least one competitor, it gets it discounted reservation value. From these one gets explicit
expressions
Uaucr =
1− e−φ − φe−φ
1− δφe−φ , (36)
V aucs =
e−φ
1− δφe−φ . (37)
These utilities are the same as in Kultti (1999), except for the slightly diﬀerent way of
discounting.
Let us now leave the auction and assume that vacancies use a continuous mixed
strategyH with support [a, b]. A vacancy’s expected utility when he oﬀers wage w ∈ [a, b]
is given by Vs:
Vs =
∞X
k=0
φke−φ
k!
£
Hk(w)(1− w) +
¡
1−Hk(w)
¢
δVs
¤
, (38)
which after some simplification equals
Vs = e−φ(1−H
k(w))(1− w) +
³
1− e−φ(1−Hk(w))
´
δVs. (39)
Next we use the fact that any wage in the support of the mixed strategy yields the same
utility to the vacancy, in particular, this holds for the lowest and the highest wages
Vs = Vs(a) = e−φ(1− a) + (1− e−φ)δVs = Vs(b) = 1− b. (40)
From this we can solve for
b = 1− e−φ(1− a)− (1− e−φ)δVs = 1− e−φ + e−φδUr − (1− e−φ)δVs, (41)
where the last equality is based on the fact that the lowest wage in the support of the
mixed strategy must equal the workers’ discounted outside option δUr, i.e. it must make
them indiﬀerent between accepting it and continuing search. Thus, we get
a = δUr. (42)
We let h(w) = H 0(w) and determine the unemployed workers’ expected utility as
Ur =
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
Z b
a
wkh(w)Hk−1(w)dw + e−φδUr, (43)
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which equals
Ur =
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
·±
b
a Hk(w)w −
Z b
a
Hk(w)dw
¸
=
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
·
b−
Z b
a
Hk(w)dw
¸
(44)
which in turn equals, using Fubini’s theorem,
Ur = b−
Z b
a
e−φ(1−H(w))dw. (45)
Inserting this and (40) into (41) yields
b = 1− e−φ − δe
−φ
1− δ
Z b
a
e−φ(1−H(w))dw. (46)
Next we impose that the expected utility of a vacancy if it uses b equals that of a
vacancy in auction:
Vs = Vs(b) = 1− b =
e−φ
1− δφe−φ , (47)
which yields
b = 1− e
−φ − δφe−φ
1− δφe−φ . (48)
Setting Vs = V (a) we get
a =
δ
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ
¢
1− δφe−φ . (49)
Using the fact that Vs = Vs(b), solving Vs from (39) and equating it with (47) yields
e−φ(1−H(w))
·
1− w − δe
−φ
1− δφe−φ
¸
=
(1− δ)e−φ
1− δφe−φ . (50)
From this we can solve the equilibrium mixed strategy
H(w) = 1− 1φ ln
µ
1− w − δe
−φ
1− δφe−φ
¶
+
1
φ ln
µ
(1− δ)e−φ
1− δφe−φ
¶
. (51)
The equilibrium mixed strategy is unobservable while the realised wages that result
from it generate an observable wage distribution. We denote the cumulative distribution
function for realised wages by M(w) and the corresponding density function is denoted
by m(w). Let us determine the probability that wage w is observed.
¡
1− e−φ
¢
m(w) =
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
kh(w)Hk−1(w) = φe−φ(1−H(w))h(w). (52)
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Here,
¡
1− e−φ
¢
is the probability that a job seeker gets at least one oﬀer. From k oﬀers
he chooses the highest one. From this we get
m(w) = e
−φ(1−H(w)) − e−φ
1− e−φ (53)
Inserting (51) above and manipulating a little yields an explicit formula
m(w) = (1− δ)e
−φ(1− δφe−φ)
(1− e−φ) [(1− w)(1− δφe−φ)− δe−φ]2
. (54)
A2.2 Unemployed workers send applications to vacancies
In the standard auction model the utilities of vacancies and unemployed workers are
V aucr = (e−θ + θe−θ)δV aucr + (1− e−θ − θe−θ)(1− δUaucs ), (55)
Uaucs = e−θ(1− δV aucr ) + (1− e−θ)δUaucs . (56)
A vacancy gets its reservation value if does not meet any job seekers or just one. In
case of two or more job seekers showing up, the vacancy gets one minus the discounted
reservation value of a job seeker. Solving these yields
V aucr =
1− e−θ − θe−θ
1− δθe−θ , (57)
Uaucs =
e−θ
1− δθe−θ . (58)
Next assume that unemployed workers use a continuous mixed strategy F with sup-
port [A,B] .An unemployed worker’s expected utility when he asks wage w ∈ [A,B] is
Us =
∞X
k=0
θke−θ
k!
³
[1− F (w)]k w +
³
1− [1− F (w)]k
´
δUs
´
⇔ Us = we−θF (w) +
¡
1− e−θF (w)
¢
δUs
⇔ Us =
we−θF (w)
1− δ + δe−θF (w) . (59)
Any wage in support [A,B] yields the same utility to a worker, especially Us(A) = Us(B):
Us(A) = Ae−θF (A) +
¡
1− e−θF (A)
¢
δUs = Be−θF (B) +
¡
1− e−θF (B)
¢
δUs = Us(B), (60)
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and using F (A) = 0 and F (B) = 1 we have
Us = A, (61)
A = Be−θ +
¡
1− e−θ
¢
δUs. (62)
The highest oﬀer the worker makes must leave the firm its discounted reservation value:
B = 1− δVr, (63)
and A can be written as
A = e−θ (1− δVr) +
¡
1− e−θ
¢
δUs. (64)
Let f(w) ≡ F 0(w) and determine a vacancy’s expected utility as
Vr =
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k!
Z B
A
(1− w) f(w)k [1− F (w)]k−1 dw + e−θδVr (65)
=
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k!
³
− [1− F (B)]k + [1− F (A)]k
´
−
Z B
A
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
k! f(w)k [1− F (w)]
k−1wdw + e−θδVr
=
∞X
k=1
θe−θ
k!
−
Z B
A
∞X
k=1
θke−θ
(k − 1)!f(w) [1− F (w)]
k−1wdw + e−θδVr
= 1− e−θ − θ
Z B
A
f(w)w
∞X
k=0
θke−θ [1− F (w)]k
k!
dw + e−θδVr
= 1− e−θ − θ
Z B
A
e−θF (w)f(w)wdw + e−θδVr
= 1− e−θ +Be−θF (B) −Ae−θF (A) −
Z B
A
e−θF (w)dw + e−θδVr
= 1− e−θ +Be−θ −A−
Z B
A
e−θF (w)dw + e−θδVr.
Then substitute 1− δVr for B and rearrange to have
Vr = 1− A−
Z B
A
e− θF (w)dw. (66)
Using (66) and A = Usin (64) we get
A =
·
1− δ
µ
1− A−
Z B
A
e−θF (w)dw
¶¸
e−θ + δ
¡
1− e−θ
¢
A (67)
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which implies that
A =
³
1− δ + δ
R B
A e
−θF (w)dw
´
e−θ
1− δ . (68)
The lower bound of the support of wage asks cannot be determined explicitly.
Next we impose that the expected utility of an unemployed worker equals that of an
unemployed worker in auction:
Us = Uaucs =
e−θ
1− δθe−θ = A. (69)
Utilizing (60) yields
Us = Be−θ +
¡
1− e−θ
¢
δUs, (70)
which gives, along with (69), that
Us =
Be−θ
1− δ + δe−θ =
e−θ
1− δθe−θ . (71)
Solving for B gives
B = 1− δ + δe
−θ
1− δθe−θ . (72)
Equating Us given by (59) and that given by (71) yields
we−θF (w)
1− δ + δe−θF (w) =
e−θ
1− δθe−θ (73)
which implies that
e−θF (w) =
(1− δ) e−θ
1− δθe−θ
w − δe
−θ
1− δθe−θ
(74)
Taking logarithms and arranging results in
F (w) = 1
θ
·
ln
µ
w − δe
−θ
1− δθe−θ
¶
− ln
µ
(1− δ) e−θ
1− δθe−θ
¶¸
. (75)
We denote again the cumulative distribution function for realised wages by G(w) and
the corresponding density function by g(w). We get
G(w) = 1− e
− θF (w)
1− e− θ (76)
=
1
1− e− θ −
(1− δ)e− θ
(1− e− θ) [w(1− δ θe− θ)− δe− θ] . (77)
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The density function is
g(w) =
(1− δ)
¡
1− δ θe− θ
¢
e− θ
(1− e− θ) [w(1− δ θe− θ)− δe− θ]2
. (78)
A2.3 The equilibrium market structure
In equilibrium, workers are indiﬀerent between sending applications and receiving oﬀers
from firms, and firms are indiﬀerent between making oﬀers and receiving applications
from workers. The equilibrium condition for a vacancy, V E, is
e−φ
1− δφe−φ =
1− e− θ − θe− θ
1− δθe− θ , (79)
and the respective condition UE for a job seeker is
e− θ
1− δθe− θ =
1− e−φ − φe−φ
1− δφe−φ . (80)
Proceeding as in the static case, it turns out that in equilibrium θ = φ = θ0 ≈ 1.146, and
x = θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
α
¡
θ20 − 1
¢ , (81)
y = αθ0 − 1
θ20 − 1
. (82)
as in the static model. Along UE,
dy
dx |UE=
P dφdx −Q
dθ
dx
Qdθdy − P
dφ
dy
, (83)
where Q ≡ −e
−θ
(1− δθe−θ)2
and P ≡
e−φ
£
(1− δ)φ+ δ
¡
1− e−φ
¢¤
(1− δφe−φ)2
. Along V E,
dy
dx |V E=
Rdθdx − S
dφ
dx
Sdφ
dy
−Rdθ
dy
, (84)
where R ≡
e−θ
£
(1− δ)θ + δ
¡
1− e−θ
¢¤
(1− δθe−θ)2
and S ≡ −e
−φ
(1− δφe−φ)2
. Curve UE is steeper
than V E if (QS −RP )
µ
dφ
dx
dθ
dy −
dθ
dx
dφ
dy
¶
> 0. In equilibrium φ = θ = θ0 ≈ 1.146,
and the sign of QS − RP turns out to be equal to the sign of (1 − δ) (1− θ0), which is
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negative. Expression
dφ
dx
dθ
dy −
dθ
dx
dφ
dy simplifies to
y − x
(1− x)2 y2
, which is negative by x > y
in equilibrium. These results yield
Proposition A2.1 In a dynamic model where the agents who exit are replaced by un-
matched clones, the mixed-strategy equilibrium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is stable.
As in the static case, the endpoints of both V E and UE are at (0, 0) and at (1, 1).
A2.4 Distribution of realised wages
Calculating the distribution of realised wages goes analogously to the corresponding task
in the static model:
r(w) =
m(w)(1− x)α
(1− x)α+ y if a ≤ w < A
m(w)(1− x)α+ g(w)y
(1− x)α+ y if A ≤ w ≤ b
g(w)yα
(1− x)α+ y if b < w ≤ B
(85)
where, in equilibrium θ = φ = θ0, and a =
δ
¡
1− e−θ0 − θ0e−θ0
¢
1− δθ0e−θ0
, b = 1− e
−θ0 − δθ0e−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
,
A = e
−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
, B = 1− δ + δe
−θ0
1− δθ0e−θ0
.
A3 A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
A3.1 Vacancies send oﬀers to unemployed workers
Assume that the total number of workers is L and the total number of employers is K.
Some of them are matched with each other in productive activities, while others are
looking for a partner. The number of unemployed is denoted by u and the number of
vacancies by v. Production happens in pairs, therefore
L− u = K − v. (86)
In each period, a firm-worker pair separates for exogenous reasons with probability s.
In a steady state, the number of new matches equals the number of separations in each
period:
yv(1− e−θ) + (1− x)u(1− e−φ) = s(K − v). (87)
There are yv waiting firms, each of them gets at least one job application with probability
1−e−θ. Each of the (1−x)u waiting job seekers gets at least one job oﬀer with probability
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1 − e−φ . For the moment we focus just on the matching market which is assumed to
be in a steady state. The only complication to the standard set-up is the exogenous
separation probability s, and the fact that a worker who is employed at wage w gets the
wage each period as long as the employment relationship lasts, and correspondingly the
employer gets 1− w each period.
A3.1.1 Auction
Let the unemployed be urns and the vacancies balls, and let φ = vu . First we determine
their expected life time utilities when wages are determined in auction where the number
of competitors is known. The timing is as follows: We determine the expected life time
utility of an unemployed worker and a vacancy at the very beginning of a period. The
utility of a worker or an employer that has a partner is evaluated right after that, i.e.
within the same period before anything else happens. After that the parties produce and
get their shares of the production. After that the pair possibly separates. The utility of
an unemployed worker is determined by
Uaucr =
¡
e−φ + φe−φ
¢
δUaucr +
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ
¢
W auc(w) (88)
where w is the wage that vacancies oﬀer when there are two or more vacancies competing
for a worker. We take it as given for now, and determine the equilibrium value later on.
We have also used the fact that when an unemployed worker meets exactly one vacancy
the vacancy makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that leaves no surplus to the worker. The
utility of a matched worker with wage w is determined by
W auc(w) = w + sδUaucr + (1− s)δW auc(w). (89)
The expected utility of a vacancy is determined by
V aucs = e−φEauc (w) +
¡
1− e−φ
¢
δV aucs (90)
where w is the wage that a vacancy oﬀers when it gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
The expected utility of an employer who employs at wage w is determined by
Eauc(w) = 1− w + sδV aucs + (1− s)δEauc(w). (91)
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From these equations we can determine the expected utilities as the function of the wages
Uaucr =
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ
¢
w
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (e−φ + φe−φ)) (92)
W auc(w) =
¡
1− δ(e−φ + φe−φ)
¢
w
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (e−φ + φe−φ)) (93)
V aucs =
e−φ(1− w)
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (1− e−φ)) (94)
Eauc(w) =
¡
1− δ + δe−φ
¢
(1− w)
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (1− e−φ)) (95)
Next we determine the two possible equilibrium wages. The higher wage w, that
comes about when several vacancies compete for a worker, must be such that all the
vacancies are indiﬀerent between paying the wage and continuing search for a worker, i.e.
1− w + sδV aucs + (1− s)δEauc(w) = δV aucs . (96)
Similarly, the lower wage w, that comes about when a vacancy meets an unemployed
worker alone and gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, is such that the worker is indif-
ferent between accepting the wage and continuing search, i.e.
w + sδUaucr + (1− s)δW auc(w) = δUaucr . (97)
Using (92)-(95), and replacing w by w in (89), and w by w in (91), we can solve
w = 1− δ (1− s) (e
−φ + φe−φ)
1− δ(1− s)φe−φ (98)
w =
δ(1− s)
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ
¢
1− δ(1− s)φe−φ (99)
Using these data we can finally solve for the expected utility of an unemployed worker
who waits
Uaucr =
1− e−φ − φe−φ
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s)φe−φ) (100)
and for the expected utility of a vacancy that moves
V aucs =
e−φ
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− s)φe−φ) (101)
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A3.1.2 The mixed strategy
The expected utility of a job seeker when the vacancies use a mixed strategy H(w) with
support [a, b] is determined by
Ur = e−φδUr +
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
Z b
a
kh(w)Hk−1(w)W (w)dw. (102)
If the job seeker receives at least one oﬀer, he chooses the highest among k oﬀers. Ex-
pression W (w) is the utility of a worker who is employed at wage w, and it is given
by
W (w) = w + sδUr + (1− s)δW (w). (103)
The employment relationship continues until it breaks down because of exogenous rea-
sons, with probability s in each period. Solving W (w) and inserting it back to (102)
yields the following formula where the last two terms result from partial integration
Ur = e−φδUr +
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
±b
a Hk(w)(1− δ + δs)−1sδUr + (104)
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
±
b
a Hk(w)(1− δ + δs)−1w −
∞X
k=1
φke−φ
k!
Z b
a
Hk(w)(1− δ + δs)−1dw.
Finally, we can simplify this by doing the summations and by changing the order of the
summation and integration in the last sum
Ur = (1− δ)−1(1− δ(1− s)e−φ)−1
½
b− ae−φ −
Z b
a
e−φ(1−H(w))dw
¾
. (105)
The expected utility of a vacancy must be the same regardless of which element it chooses
from the support of its mixed strategy. Let us denote the utility of a vacancy that uses
a by V 1−as . It is determined by
V 1−as = e−φ
£
1− a+ sδV 1−as + (1− s)δE(1− a)
¤
+ (1− e−φ)δV 1−as , (106)
where E(1 − a) is the utility of a matched firm that pays wage a. Analogously, if a
vacancy uses b its utility is determined by
V 1−bs = 1− b+ sδV 1−bs + (1− s)δE(1− b) (107)
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as oﬀering the highest possible wage means that the wage is always accepted. Finally, if
the vacancy oﬀers wage w, its utility is determined by
V 1−ws =
∞X
k=0
φke−φ
k!

 H
k(w) (1− w + sδV 1−ws + (1− s)δE(1− w))
+
¡
1−Hk(w)
¢
δV 1−ws

 , (108)
where Hk(w) is the probability that all other k oﬀers are less than w. The utilities for a
firm from being in an employment relationship at a specific wage are easily determined
from equations
E(a) = 1− a+ sδV 1−as + (1− s)δE(a), (109)
E(b) = 1− b+ sδV 1−bs + (1− s)δE(b), (110)
E(w) = 1− w + sδV 1−ws + (1− s)δE(w). (111)
Solving from these the expected utilities and inserting in formulae (106)-(108) and in
turn forcing them to yield the same expected utility as auction, namely that given by
(101) allows us to solve for the endpoints of the support of the mixed strategy as well as
the mixed strategy itself
a =
δ(1− s)
¡
1− e−φ − φe−φ
¢
1− δ(1− s)φe−φ (112)
b = 1− δ(1− s)φe
−φ − e−φ
1− δ(1− s)φe−φ (113)
H(w) = 1φ ln
µ
1− δ(1− s)
(1− w) [1− δ(1− s)φe−φ]− δ(1− s)e−φ
¶
(114)
We denote the cumulative distribution function for realised wages by M(w) and the
corresponding density function is denoted by m(w). We get
M(w) = e
−φ(1−H(w)) − e−φ
1− e−φ (115)
=
(1− δ(1− s))e−φ
(1− e−φ) [(1− w)(1− δ(1− s)φe−φ)− δ(1− s)e−φ] −
e−φ
1− e−φ . (116)
The density function is
m(w) =
¡
1− δ(1− s)φe−φ
¢
(1− δ(1− s))e−φ
(1− e−φ) [(1− w)(1− δ(1− s)φe−φ)− δ(1− s)e−φ]2
. (117)
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A3.2 Unemployed workers send applications to vacancies
A3.2.1 Auction
Let θ = uv . The utility of a vacancy is determined by
V aucr =
¡
e− θ + θe− θ
¢
δV aucr +
¡
1− e− θ − θe− θ
¢
Eauc(w) (118)
where w is the wage that an unemployed worker oﬀers when there are two or more workers
competing for a vacancy. Note that when a vacancy meets exactly one worker the worker
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that leaves no surplus to the vacancy. The utility of an
employer who employes at wage w is Eauc(w), determined by
Eauc(w) = 1− w + sδV aucr + (1− s)δEauc(w). (119)
The expected utility of an unemployed worker is determined by
Uaucs = e− θW auc (w) +
¡
1− e− θ
¢
δUaucs (120)
where w is the wage that a worker oﬀers when it gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.
The utility of a matched worker who is paid wage w is W auc(w),determined by
W auc(w) = w + δsUaucs + δ(1− s)W auc(w). (121)
From (118)-(121) we can solve
V aucr =
¡
1− e− θ − θe− θ
¢
(1− w)
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (e− θ + θe− θ)) (122)
Eauc (w) =
¡
1− δ(e− θ + θe− θ)
¢
(1− w)
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (e− θ + θe− θ)) (123)
Uaucs =
e− θw
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (1− e− θ)) (124)
W auc (w) =
¡
1− δ + δe− θ
¢
(1− w)
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) (1− e− θ)) (125)
The two possible equilibrium wages are :
w: Several workers compete for a vacancy, all of them are indiﬀerent between working at
the wage and continuing search:
w + sδUaucs + (1− s) δW auc(w) = δUaucs . (126)
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w: A worker is the only applicant and gets to make a take-or-leave-it oﬀer. The firm is
indiﬀerent between accepting the wage and continuing search:
1− w + sδV aucr + (1− s) δEauc(1− w) = δV aucr (127)
Using (122)-(125), and replacing w by w in (119), and w by w in (121) we can solve
w = 1− δ (1− s) (1− e
− θ)
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ , (128)
w = δ (1− s) e
− θ
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ . (129)
Using (128) and (129) we can solve for the expected utility of a vacancy that waits
V aucr =
1− e− θ − θe− θ
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s) θe− θ) , (130)
and for the expected utility of a moving unemployed worker
Uaucs =
e− θ
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− s) θe− θ) . (131)
A3.2.2 The mixed strategy
The expected utility of a vacancy when the workers use mixed strategy F (w) with support
[A,B] is determined by
Vr = e− θδVr +
∞X
k=1
θke− θ
k!
Z B
A
kf(w) [1− F (w)]k−1E(w)dw. (132)
The utility of a filled vacancy is
E(w) = 1− w + sδVr + (1− s)δE(w). (133)
Solving E(w) and inserting it back to (132) yields the following formula where the last
two terms result from partial integration
Vr = e− θδVr +
∞X
k=1
θke− θ
k!
±
B
A
h
− [1− F (w)]k
i
(1− δ + δs)−1sδVr + (134)
∞X
k=1
θke− θ
k!
±
B
A
h
− [1− F (w)]k
i
(1− δ + δs)−1 (1− w)− (135)
∞X
k=1
θke− θ
k!
Z B
A
[1− F (w)]k (1− δ + δs)−1dw.
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Finally, we can simplify this by doing the summations and by changing the order of the
summation and integration in the last sum
Vr = (1− δ)−1(1− δ(1− s)e− θ)−1
·
1−A− (1−B) e−φ −
Z B
A
e− θF (w)dw
¸
. (136)
The expected utility of an unemployed worker must be the same regardless of which
element he chooses from the support of his mixed strategy. The utility of a worker that
uses A is
UAs = A+ sδUAs + (1− s)δW (A), (137)
where W (A) is the worker’s utility from working at wage A. Oﬀering the lowest possible
wage means that the wage is always accepted. The utility of a worker that uses B is
UBs = e− θ
£
B + sδUBs + (1− s)δW (B)
¤
+ (1− e− θ)δUBs , (138)
as with probability 1 − e− θ the worker has competitors and his oﬀer B will not be
accepted. Finally, if the worker oﬀers wage w, his utility is determined by
Uws =
∞X
k=0
θke− θ
k!
h
[1− F (w)]k (w + sδUws + (1− s)δW (w)) +
³
1− (1− F (w))k
´
δUws
i
.
(139)
The utilities of being employed at a specific wage are
W (A) = A+ sδUAs + (1− s) δW (A) (140)
W (B) = h+ sδUBs + (1− s) δW (B) (141)
W (w) = w + sδUws + (1− s) δW (w) (142)
Solving from these the expected utilities and inserting in formulae (137)-(139) and in
turn forcing them to yield the same expected utility as auction, namely that given by
(131) allows us to solve for the endpoints of the support of the mixed strategy as well as
the mixed strategy itself
A = e
− θ
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ , (143)
B =
1− δ(1− s)
¡
1− e− θ
¢
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ , (144)
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F (w) = 1θ ln
"
w
£
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ
¤
− δ(1− s)e− θ
e− θ(1− δ(1− s))
#
. (145)
We denote the cumulative distribution function for the realised wages by G(w) and
the corresponding density function is denoted by g(w)
G(w) = 1− e
− θF (w)
1− e− θ (146)
=
1
1− e− θ −
(1− δ(1− s))e− θ
(1− e− θ) [w(1− δ(1− s) θe− θ)− δ(1− s)e− θ] (147)
The density function is
g(w) =
¡
1− δ(1− s) θe− θ
¢
(1− δ(1− s))e− θ
(1− e− θ) [w(1− δ(1− s) θe− θ)− δ(1− s)e− θ]2
(148)
A3.3 The equilibrium market structure
In equilibrium, workers are indiﬀerent between sending applications and receiving oﬀers
from firms, and firms are indiﬀerent between making oﬀers and receiving applications
from workers. That is, for a job seeker, the equilibrium condition UE is
e−θ
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− s)θe−θ) =
1− e−φ − φe−φ
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s)φe−φ) , (149)
and for a vacancy, the equilibrium condition V E is
e−φ
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− s)φe−φ) =
1− e−θ − θe−θ
(1− δ) (1− δ(1− s)θe−θ) . (150)
The left-hand side are utilities from sending wage demands or oﬀers, and the right-
hand sides are utilities from receiving them. It turns out that in equilibrium θ = φ ≡
θ0 ≈ 1.146, and there exists a unique equilibrium for strictly positive x and y:
x = θ0 (αθ0 − 1)
α
¡
θ20 − 1
¢ , (151)
y = αθ0 − 1
θ20 − 1
, (152)
where α = u
v
. However, two markets coexist only if x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1). These hold
only if α ∈
µ
1
θ0
, θ0
¶
.
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A3.4 Stability of the equilibrium market structure
Applying the stability analysis of the simpler dynamic model above but using δ (1− s)
as a discount factor instead of δ, gives
Proposition A3.1 In the general equilibrium dynamic model the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is stable.
Plugging the above solutions for x and y intom(w) and g(w) and using the appropriate
ranges for the distributions just like in the two models above, and noting that in an
equilibrium where two markets coexist we have θ = φ = θ0, we get the equilibrium
distribution for the realised wages. The density function has approximately the same
shape as the one produced by the static model.
A3.5 Steady state
In a steady state equilibrium the number of matches equals the number of separations:
yv(1− e−θ) + (1− x)u(1− e−φ) = s(K − v), (153)
where yv(1− e−θ) is the number of matches that form in a market where firms are urns,
and (1 − x)u(1 − e−φ) is the number of matches in the market where workers are urns,
and s(K−v) is number of matches that break down per period. From (153) we can solve
v = Ks− (1− x)u(1− e
−φ)
y(1− e−θ) + s (154)
On the other hand, from equation K − v = L− u it follows that
v = K − L+ u. (155)
From (154) and (155) we can solve, noting that in equilibrium θ = φ = θ0 :
u = y(1− e
−θ0)(L−K) + Ls
y(1− e−θ0) + (1− x)(1− e−θ0) + s (156)
v = (1− x)(1− e
−θ0)(K − L) +Ks
y(1− e−θ0) + (1− x)(1− e−θ0) + s (157)
When we substitute (151) and (152) for x and y in (156) and (157) we get that u =
f(L,K, s, θ0) and v = g(L,K, s, θ0).
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Figure 1: The mixed strategy equilibrium where x ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1) is evolutionarily
stable.
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Figure 2: Distributions of realized wages in the static model when u = v. a) job seeker
market (vacancies send oﬀers), b) vacancy market (job seekers send oﬀers), c) the aggre-
gate distribution
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Figure 3: The aggregate distribution of realized wages in the static model, a) u/v = 1.05,
b) u/v = 1.14, c) u/v = 1.5
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